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1939] NOTES
BILLS AND NOTES-FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION-Defendant
executed a promissory note as consideration for an undertaking
by La Salle Extension University to furnish him instruction by
correspondence. Upon defendant's refusal to pay the note at
maturity, suit was brought thereon.' Held, that the defenses of
failure or nontender of performance could not be set up even
though the holder was a party to the contract from which the
note arose. 2 Boelte v. West, 185 So. 471 (La. App. 1939).
At common law, in contracts containing mutual promises to
perform, full performance or tender thereof on the part of a
plaintiff is generally required as a condition precedent to his
right to enforce performance of the counter promise.3 This rigid
rule is qualified by the doctrine of substantial performance, which
permits recovery in spite of default by the plaintiff on some
minor particular.4 The rule as thus qualified is followed in
Louisiana.5
These views flow necessarily from the fact that the perform-
ance promised by one party is recognized as the equivalent( of
the performance promised in return-the "bargained-for ex-
change."' This being so, there results a failure of consideration
where there is a failure of performance on either side." This
doctrine is consecrated in the Louisiana Civil Code by articles
1. Suit was brought by an assignee, Boelte. "It is admitted that Boelte,
the nominal plaintiff, is not in reality the owner of the note, but is named
as assignee of the note merely for the purpose of bringing this suit.
Boelte v. West, 185 So. 471, 472 (La. App. 1939),
In the opinion the case is treated as if the original holder was suing
in his own name.
2. The court also held that a "putting in default" is not required before
a suit on a promissory note can be brought; but this point is not within
the scope of the present discussion.
3. Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, 192 N.C. 330, 135 S.E. 141 (1926). See also 3
Williston, Contracts (1936) §§ 813, 832; Restatement, Contracts (1932) §§ 266,
267, 268.
4. Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 156 Fed. 922 (C.C.A. 8th, 1907); Desmond-
Dunne Co. v. Friedman-Doscher Co., 162 N.Y. 486, 56 N.E. 995 (1900).
5. Dugue v. Levy, 114 La. 21, 37 So. 995 (1904); Pratt v. McCoy, 128 La.
570, 54 So. 1012 (1911); Peterson v. Peralta, 3 La. App. 516 (1926). See also Art.
2769, La. Civil Code of 1870; Cairy v. Randolph, 6 La. Ann. 202 (1851); Rei-
mann Constr. Co. v. Upton, 178 So. 528 (La. App. 1938).
6. Art. 1768, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Commutative contracts are those
in which what is done, given or promised by one party, is considered as
equivalent to, or a consideration for what is done, given, or promised by
the other." (Italics supplied.)
Art. 1770, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A contract containing mutual cove-
nants shall be presumed to be commutative, unless the contrary be expressed."
7. Consideration has been defined as that which is "bargained for and
given in exchange for the promise." Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 75.
.8. National Surety Co. v. Long, 125 Fed. 887 (C.C.A. 8th, 1903); Leonard v.
Dyer, 26 Conn. 172, 68 Am. Dec. 382 (1857); Dauchey v. Drake, 85 N.Y. 407
(1881).
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which require the presence of causa or consideration as a neces-
sary element in the contract, and provide the resolutory condi-
tion'0 if there is a failure thereof.
The instant case involved an ordinary commutative contract.
In return for a promise to furnish the defendant a certain course
of instruction over a period of time, the defendant gave his
promise, represented by a promissory note, to pay the price
thereof. The furnishing of the course of instruction was then the
agreed equivalent of the payment of the price. As a defense to
an action on the note the defendant alleges a failure of perform-
ance by the plaintiff. If suit had been brought by one of the
parties to the contract to enforce the promise to pay (as it might
properly have been), there seems little doubt that the defense
alleged would have been valid. Is a different result required
because suit is brought on the note?
Following the common law authorities the same result would
be reached, for a negotiable instrument is no different from any
other contract in so far as the requirement of consideration is
concerned." Where promissory notes are given in consideration
of an agreement whereby the payee is to perform certain acts
which he does not thereafter perform, this failure of consideration
is a defense to an action on the note.' 2 The same conclusion should
be reached in Louisiana. It has been held that the defenses that
may be set up on ordinary contracts are available to the maker
against original parties thereto and against any other person not
a holder in due course. 8 Furthermore, Section 28 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law 4 provides that "Absence or failure
9. Art. 1893, La. Civil Code of 1870: "An obligation without a cause or
with a false or unlawful cause can have no effect."
10. Art. 2046, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A resolutory condition is implied
in all commutative contracts, to take effect, in case either of the parties do
[sic) not comply with his engagements .. " Art. 2047, La. Civil Code of
1870, states that the resolutory condition is available "In all cases . . . by
suit or by exception." See also Arts. 1912, 1913, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. Hammond v. Tate, 83 F. (2d) 69, 105 A.L.R. 433, (C.C.A. 10th, 1936);
Irwin v. State National Bank of Ft. Worth, 224 S.W. 246 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920).
12. Russ Lumber & Mill Co. v. Muscupiabe Land & Water Co., 120 Cal.
521, 52 Pac. 995 (1898); Shephard v. Hawley, 1 Conn. 367, 6 Am. Dec. 244
(1815).
13. B. Olinde & Sons Co. v. Istrouma Mercantile Co., 172 So. 793 (La. App.
1937). The defenses are available, a fortiori, if the note is non-negotiable.
14. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was adopted in Louisiana
by Act 64 of 1904 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 790-986). Section 28 codifies prior
Louisiana jurisprudence-LeBlanc v. Sanglair, 12 Mart. (O.S.) 402, 13 Am.
Dec. 377 (1822); Byrd v. Craig, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 625 (1823); Phillips v. W. T.
Adams Mach. Co., 52 La. Ann. 442, 27 So. 65 (1899).
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of consideration is a matter of defense as against any person not
a holder in due course." 15
In the instant case, it was stated that, if the University had
failed to fulfill its contractual obligations, it might be liable in a
subsequent suit for damages. Denial of the defense of failure of
consideration, then, results in complete circuity of action and
additional court costs. In view of the express provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, the general contract principles em-
bodied in the Code,16 and the previous decisions in analagous
cases,'7 the holding of the court in the instant case seems unsound.
When, as in the present case, the action is brought by one who
is not a holder in due course, a more satisfactory result would be
reached by sustaining the defense of failure of consideration. In
this way, the entire controversy would be settled in a single
action, whether brought on the note or the contract, and justice
could be attained for the maker without violating any of the
provisions enacted for the protection of the sanctity and integrity
of negotiable instruments.
A.R.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WELL-SPACING LEGISLATIoN-Plaintiff,
the owner of six and one-quarter acres of a ten acre "drilling
unit," sought to recover the entire royalty from a producing well
located on his property. He contended that the Oklahoma "well-
spacing" act,' providing for a proportionate distribution of the
royalty among the owners of royalty interests in each "drilling
unit,"2 was unconstitutional as a violation of "due process" and
"separation of powers." Held, (1) the act is a reasonable exercise
of the police power; (2) the Corporations Commission, which
administers it, is excepted by the Oklahoma constitution itself
from the operation of the "separation of powers" clause. Patter-
15. Therefore, the failure of the payee of a note to fulfill the obligation
which constitutes the consideration for which it was given extinguishes the
obligation of the maker of the note to pay it. Bonnet-Brown Sales Service
v. The Bunkie Record, 3 La. App. 410 (1926); Parks v. Cilluffa, 7 La. App.
749 (1928); Hick's v. Levett, 19 La. App. 836, 140 So. 276 (1932); Stamn
Scheele, Inc. v. Loewer, 149 So. 908 (La. App. 1933).
16. See notes 6, 9 and 10, supra.
17. See notes 14 and 15, supra.
1. Okla. Laws 1935, c. 59, art. 1 [Okla. Stats. Ann. (1937) tit. 52, §§ 85-87].
2. Okla. Laws 1935, c. 59, art. 1, § 3 [Okla. Stats. Ann. (1937) tit. 52, §
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